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Tenure  Structure  in  the  E.E.C. 
The  basic aim  of  the  tenure  structure of  any  country  should  be  to  influence 
agricultural  productivity  in  a  positive sense.  It  may  achieve this aim 
through  the  incentive  which  the tenure  arrangements  offer  for  effective 
participation of  farmers,  farm  workers  and  credit  institutions  in  farm 
development,  through  the  security it  offers  individual  farm  families  and 
through  its  capacity to adjust  to  the  requirements  of  agricultural  and 
general  economic  development. 
In  all Member  States  except  Belgium  occupier-ownership  of  land  is the 
dominant  system  of  land  tenure, although its importance  varies,  in  some 
cases  substantially, between  one  Member  State to  another  (table 1). 
Furthermore,  recent  evidence  suggests that this tenure  system  is becoming 
still more  important. 
Table  1  Percentage  Distribution of  Total  Utilised Agricultural 
Area, according  to Tenure  System,  by  Member  States 
Total  Uti- Tenure  System  lised Agri- Member  State  cultural  Occupier- Ten an- Share- Other  Total 
Area  Owner- cy  tenancy 
(1000  ha)  ship 
GERMANY  12.678  77,7  22,1  - 0,2  100,0 
FRANCE  31.727  51,8  45,9  2,3  - 100,0 
ITALY  17.928  70,0  17,8  8,9  3,3  100,0 
NETHERLANDS  2.143  51,9  48,1  - - 100,0 
BELGIUM  1. 540  28,6  71,4  - - 100,0 
LUXEMBOURG  134  64,5  29,1  0,9  5 ,s  100,0 
E U R - 6  66.150  61,0  34,0  3,5  1,5  100,0 
UNITED  KINGDOM  (1)  10.932  53,1  46,9  - - 100,0 
IRELAND  4.739  92,0  8,0  - - 100,0 
DENMARK  2.915  90,0  10,0  - - 100,0 
E U R - 9  84.736  63,0  34,0  2,7  0,3  100,0 
(1)  Exclud1ng  Scotland and  Northern  Ireland. 
* Text  based  on  a  lecture  given  at  Reading  University,  February  16th  1977. 
by  John  J.  Scully  - Chief  adviser,  Directorate  General  Agriculture. - 2 -
The  increasing  importance  of  occupier-ownership  may  be  explained  in  the  fol 
lowing  ways  among  others.  Firstly, the attainment  of  occupier-ownership 
during  the  course  of  a  farming  generation  is a  logical goal  of  many  farm 
families.  Indeed  it would  appear  that, at the  level  of  the original  Commu-
nity, farm  ownership  increases significantly with  increasing  age  of  farmer 
(table  2).  This  applies  in  particular to full-time  farmers,  i.e.  those 
engaged  in  farming  for  100  per  cent  of  their working  time.  Secondly, 
Table  2  :  Percentage  Distribution of  Utilised Agricultural  Area  among 
full-time  and  part-time  farmers,  by  Age  Group  and  Tenure  Status 
of  Farmers,  EUR-6,  1966/67. 
Age  of  farmers 
Tenure  Status 
14  to  34  years 
occupier-ownership 
tenancy 
35  to 44  years 
occupier-ownership 
tenancy 
45  to  49  years 
occupier-ownership 
tenancy 
50-54  years 
occupier-ownership 
tenancy 
55-64  years 
occupier-ownership 
tenancy 
65  years and  over 
occupier-ownership 
tenancy 
Full-
time 
farmers 
%  UAA 
40,5 
45,8 
44,3 
40,9 
49,0 
35,1 
54,0 
30,8 
59,3 
28,8 
72,3 
20,4 
Part-time  farms  on  which  the  farm 
head  engages  in  off-farm employment 
for  50  per  cent  for  more  than  50  Tot  l 
or  less of  his to- per  cent  of  his 
tal working  hours  total working 
per year  hours  per  year 
% UAA  % UAA  % U A 
3,3 
2,7 
3,5 
2,4 
3,7 
2,0 
3,6 
1 ,5 
3,0 
1,2 
1,9 
0,6 
5,4 
2,3 
6,6 
2,3 
8,0 
2,2 
8,1 
2,0 
6,3 
1,4 
4,2 
0,6 
49  2 
50  8 
54,4 
4  ,6 
6  ,7 
3  ,3 
6  ,7 
3  ,3 
68,6 
3  ,4 
i8,4 
1,6 
Source  :  OSCE- Enqu~te sur  La  structure  des  exploitations agricoles,  19  6/67. 
These  data  are  somewhat  outdated;  however,  they  are  still valua  le 
insofar as  they  represent  the only  set  of  harmonised  statistics 
on  the  subject  in  the original  Community.  Comparable  data  for  t  e 
three  new  Member  States are  not  available. - 3  -
in  a  period of  rapid  inflation  investment  in  land  is, perhaps,  the most 
appropriate  way  of  offsetting a  rapid depreciation of  liquid assets. 
Thirdly,  it is clear  (tables  3  and  4)  that  in  recent  times  the  Larger 
farms  are  growing  still larger  while  the  smaller  farms  are  decreasing 
in  number.  But,  in  the  case  of  the  larger-scale farmer  with  ample  access 
to  capital the  conflict  between  investing  in  land  and  investing  in  current 
production  is not  a  factor  of  relatively great  importance  since  it  would 
not  be  too difficult  for  him  to  opt  for  ownership  of  land  rather  than 
tenancy  in  expanding  his total farm  area.  Finally,  in  some  of  Member 
States where  tenancy  is  important,  the evolution of  lease  rents  has  not 
kept  pace  with  the evolution of  farmland  prices;  as  a  result  farm  tenancy 
is  becoming  progressively  less attractive vis-a-vis  land  ownership. 
Legislation  relating to  land  ownership  and  tenancy 
In  the majority  of Member  states there  is  no  legal  upper  limit  on  the 
amount  of  land  which  might  be  owned  by  any  single  individual;  however, 
in  some  Member  States, particularly  in  Germany  and  in  Ireland there  are 
restrictions  on  the  sub-division  of  farms  into non-viable  units.  In  France, 
where  there  is no  upper  limit  on  the size of  holding  which  may  be  held  in 
property,  there  is nevertheless  a  Limit  on  the  area  which  may  be  farmed 
by  any  one  individual.  This  latter area,  which  varies according  to  indi-
vidual  Departments,  is governed  by  the  regulations  on  the  amalgamation  of 
holdings  (Loi  des  Cumuls)  which  are  intended to  check  the  enlargement  of 
farms  which  may  be  considered  as  excessive  from  a  social  point  of  view. 
In  Denmark,  the  Law  on  Agricultural  Holdings,  1973,  also assigns  an  upper 
limit  of  100  hectares  for  the  amalgamation  of  holdings,  and  the  individual 
farmer  is only  allowed  to  acquire  two  farms. 
Legal  controls  on  farm  tenancy exist  with  varying  degrees  of  impact  in  six 
of the nine  Member  States of  the  Community,  the exceptions  being  Luxembourg, 
Ireland  and  Denmark.  In  the  latter two  Member  States  farm  tenancy is, 
however,  of  relatively minor  importance  only. 
Table  3  :  Annual  rate of  change  (%)  in  the number  of  Farm  Holding  according 
to size,  by  Member  State, 1960  to  1970 
Member  Size  of  ho ldin  ( ha)  All  State  1- <  5  5- (  10  1D- (  20  2D- <50  50+  holdings  . 
Germany  -4,1  -3,8  -0,7  +2,6  +1, 7  -2,4 
France  -3,5  -4,0  -2,8  +0,2  +2, 1  -2,2 
Italy  -2,3  -3,0  -2,3  -0,9  +1, 1  -2,3 
Net her lands  -7,0  -4,5  -0,3  +1,3  +2, 1  -3,3 
Belgium  -7,5  -4,6  -0,5  +3,3  +1,8  -4,1 
Luxembourg  -7,6  -6,3  -5,5  +1,4  +5,0  -3,9 
E U R - 6  -3,0  -3,6  -1,9  +0,7  +1,8  -2,4 
United  Kingdom  -7,8  -3,8  -3,7  -2,1  +0,3  -3,4 
Ireland  -0,4  -1,5  -0,2  +0,3  +0, 1  -0,4 
Denmark  -7,1  -5,7  -2,1  +0, 1  +3,2  -3,0 
E U R - 9  -3,1  -3,6  -1,9  +0,3  +1,3  -2,4 
Source  SOEC  - Yearbook  of  Agricultural Statistics, 1974. - 4-
Table  4  Annual  rate  of  change  (%)  in  the number  of  farm  holdings 
according  to size, by  Member  State,  1970  to 1975. 
Member  Size of  holding  (ha)  All 
State  1- (  5  5- ( 10  1Q- (  20  2D- <50  50+  holdings 
Germany  - 5,4  - 5,1  - 4,4  + 3,0  +6,1  - 3,5 
France  - 4,8  - 6,6  - 5,0  - 0,2  +3, 1  - 2,9 
Italy  - - - - - -
Netherlands  - 3,5  - 4,9  - 3,1  + 1,8  +4,4  - 2,6 
Belgium  - 7,2  - 6,6  - 2,9  + 2,4  +5,1  - 4,1 
Luxembourg  - 6,3  - 7,7  - 7,9  - 1,5  +11,5  - 4,2 
E U R - 6  - - - - - -
United  Kingdom  - 6,2  - 3,1  - 2,9  - 2,2  -0,4  - 2,6 
Ireland  - - - - - -
Denmark  - 1,1  - 3,7  - 3,3  - 0,3  +3,2  - 2,2 
E U R - 9  - - - - - -
Source  1)  SDEC,  Yearbook  of  Agricultural Statistics,  1975 
2)  The  Agricultural  Situation  in  the  Community  - 1975  Report 
The  respective  legislations on  farm  tenancy  have  some  features  in  common 
in  France,  the Netherlands  and  Belgium.  Thus,  in  all  three Member  States  ·•_). 
rental  levels  are  controlled  by  legislation;  tenants  have  the  right  of 
renewal  of  leases  at  the end  of  the tenancy period;  heirs  to tenants 
have  the  right  of  succession;  tenants must  be  compensated  for  improve-
ments  in  cases  where  the  tenancy  contract  is terminated;  land  owners 
cannot  resume  occupation  of  their  land  unless  they,  or their  successors, 
wish  to  farm  it themselves.  In  France  and  Belgium  tenants  have  the  right 
of  pre-emption  in  the  case  of  sale, whilst  in  the  Netherlands  they  have 
the  right  of first  preference to  buy.  The  normal  tenancy  period  is  9  yea  s 
in  the  case of  France  and  Belgium.  Exceptionally  long-term  leases  of  18 
or  25  years exist also  in  France  which  can  be  terminated  by  special  extr -
judicial act  at  the  end  of  this period.  Long-term  leases  cannot  however, 
be  renewed  once  the  tenant  reaches  65  years  of  age.  In  the  Netherlands 
the  legal  tenancy period  is 6  years  for  parcels of  land  and  12  years  of 
farms. 
In  Germany,  leases  have  no  minimum  or maximum  duration  but  9  to  12  year 
tenancy  periods are  the most  popular.  The  tenant  has  no  right  of 
preemption  in  case  of  sale;  heirs,  however,  have  the  right  of  succession 
·Leases  can  be  annulled  by  the authorities  in  cases  of  bad  husbandry,  und  e 
fragmentation  or  undesirable  land  distribution. 
In  Italy the tenancy period  can  be  of  indefinite  length  in  the  case  of 
"coltivatori diretti", otherwise  the normal  period  is  15  years.  This  per  od 
can  be  extended  for  a  further  12  years  in  cases  where  tenants  undertake 
certain  improvements  to  land  and  buildings  at  their  own  expense.  Maximum 
rents are  fixed  every  four  years  by  a  provincial  Commission.  The  tenant 
has  the  right  of  preemption  in  the  case  of  sale, while  heirs  have  the - 5  -
right  of  succession. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  Legislation exists, the  main  purpose  of  which  is to 
provide  for  any  tenancy  (with  the  exception of  specified  short-term 
Lettings)  to  continue  in  force  from  year  to year  until  terminated  by  a 
valid notice to  quit.  Such  notice must  be  given  12  months  in  advance  and 
if disputed  may  be  referred to the  Agricultural  Land  Tribunal  or  the 
Scottish Land  Court  for  decision.  The  great  majority  of  tenancies  in  the 
UK  are  held  on  this basis  but  in  the event  of  a  holding  being  Let  on 
Lease  for  2 years or more,  the  Legislation provides that notice to  quit 
(which  is  subject  to the  same  restrictions as  for  annual  tenancies)  can 
only  be  given  to expire  at  the  end  of  the  Lease  in  default  of  which  the 
tenant  continues  in  occupation  on  the  Legislated annual  tenancy.  The  Le-
gislation provides  for  adjustments  in  rental  charges  every  3  years  (5  years 
in  Scotland)  from  the  commencement  of  the  tenancy.  In  effect, the tenant 
has  a  very  high  degree  of  security of  tenure  in  that  in  many  cases  it 
provides  for  retention of  the  tenancy  until  the tenant  wishes  to  release 
the  holding. 
In  an  era  of  rapidly  increasing  Land  prices, the  expansion  of  farm  tenancy 
should  give a  positive stimulus  to  Land  mobility.  Moreover,  a  tenancy  sys-
tem  favours  farm  structure  improvements  more  than  one  of  small  owner-
occupiers;  as tenants  Leave,  Landlords  are  able to effect  amalgamation. 
The  past  high  incidence  of  tenant  farming  in  the  United  Kingdom  is one  of 
the main  reasons  for  the present  high  average  size of  farms. 
In  some  Member  States,  however,  notably  in  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
and  Belgium,  the existing tenure  Legislation  is such  as  to  give the  tenant 
and  his  heirs an  almost  absolute  security of  tenure  while  at  the  same  time 
effectively  controlling  rental  charges.  The  effects of  such  Legislation  on 
Land  mobility  is deserving  of  detailed study, particularly  insofar as it 
applies  to  regions  of  poor  farm  structure where  the offer of  Land  for  sale 
is  Limited  or  where  farmland  prices are unduly  high. 
Land  Prices  and  Lease  Rents 
The  price of  farmland  as  determined  by  the  free  operation of  the  Land 
market  must  rank  high  in  order or priority among  the  various factors  which 
influence  Land  mobility.  At  any  given  point  in  time  this price is normally 
influenced  by  the  interplay of  a  number  of  different  elements,  some  inter-
nal  to agriculture, others external  to it.  In  effect,  Land  has  some  unique 
characteristics  which  distinguish  it from  other  resources  of production 
and  which  cause  it to  respond  in  special  ways  to price  shifts and  institu-
tional  changes.  Two  such  characteristics are  its  Limited  supply  and  its 
fixety  in  space. 
With  the progress  of  economic  development  the  demand  for  Land  for  alterna-
tive uses- urban/industrial development,  amenity  etc.  - is becomingly 
increasingly more  competitive, particularly  in  countries  with  high  popu-
Lation  densities.  In  such  circumstances,  the market  price of  farmland  tends 
to diverge,  in  some  cases  substantially so, from  its agricultural  use-value. 
Furthermore,  in  a  period of  inflation,  characteristic of  the  economic 
recession  of  recent  years,  the tendency  towards  investment  in  Land,  as  a 
''hedge''  against  inflation is further  accentuated.  Much  of  this  investment 
is highly  speculative;  many  of  the  investors originate  in  the non-agricul-- 6-
tural  sectors and  their activities  in  this field  add  additional  impetus 
to  the  upward  pressure  on  Land  prices. 
The  competition for  Land  however,  is not  simply  one  between  agricultural 
and  non-agricultural  Land  users.  Much  of  the  increase  in  Land  prices which 
has  occurred  in  recent  times  may  be  attributed to  competition  among  farmers 
themselves,  who  in  their efforts to acquire ownership  of  additional  Land, 
are  often  willing  to pay  prices far  in  excess  of  the marginal  value  pro-
ductivity of  the  Land  in  question.  But  more  often  than  not,  many  of  those 
who  can  afford  to pay  such  prices are  relatively  Large-scale  farmers 
already.  And  so,  whether  the  competition  for  Land  is  internal  or external 
to agriculture,  the  increase  in  farmland  prices  resulting  from  it  creates 
major  problems  for  small-scale  farmers  who  wish  to  acquire  extra  Land  and 
for  new  entrants  to  farming,  generally  young  people,  who  must  of  necessi-
ty purchase  an  entire farm. 
In  the  case  of  these  Latter  groups  investment  in  Land  on  an  occupier-
ownership  basis  is a  hazardous  proposition  in  modern  times  when  Land  prices 
are  highly  inflated  and  interest  rates  on  borrowed  capital are  unduly  high. 
For  them  an  adequate  return  on  their  investment  is scarcely  realisable. 
Statistical data  on  Land  prices,  where  available,  suggest  a  rather  wide 
variation  among  Member  States,  both  as  regards average  price  Levels  them-
selves  and  annual  price  increases  (table 5).  Average  prices  tend  to  be  much 
higher  in  Belgium  than  elsewhere.  Between  1963  and  1970,  the  average  annual 
price  increase varied  according  to use- orientation (tillage or pasture) 
from  between  5  and  6  per  cent  in  Germany,  Italy and  the Netherlands  to 
between  9  and  10  per  cent  in  France  (tillage  Land),  Belgium  (pastur~, 
England  and  wales  and  Denmark.  After  1970  however,  the  variation  in  price 
increases  was  far more  pronounced,  the more  striking  increases occurring 
in  the three  new  Member  States  in  the  early  years  (1970/73)  of  this  period. 
After  1973,  the  available data  show  a  further  upsurge  in  Land  prices  in 
France,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Denmark.  Substantial  increases  in 
England  and  Wales  in  1973/74  were  offset  to  some  extent  in  1974/75  when 
Land  prices declined  by  18  per  cent. 
Thus,  taking  an  index  of  100  for  the  average  price of  farmland  per  hectare 
in  England  and  Wales  in  1975,  the  comparative  figures  for  other Member 
States of  the  E.E.C.  would  be:  Germany,  159,6;  France,  81,4;  Netherlands, 
127,1; Belgium,  182,8;  Denmark,  128,0. 
The  evolution of  Lease  rents during  recent years  has  not  kept  pace  with 
that  of  Land  prices  in  any  Member  State.  In  the  United  Kingdom  (England 
and  Wales)  the  decline  in  Land  prices  in  1974/75  was  accompanied  by  a 
substantial  increase  in  rental  charges  due  to  the  ending  of  restrictions 
applied  under  the  Prices and  Incomes  Policy which  had  frozen  all  rents. 
As  a  result  of  this  Latter  increase  the  Landowner's  return  on  his  Land 
investment  has  risen  from  1,8%  (which  was  on  a  par  with  the  relatively 
Low  rental  returns  which  prevail  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  Community) 
to  2,6 %. 
In  the final  analysis it is apparent  that the  legislative  impediment  to 
the expansion  of  farm  tenancy,  on  the one  hand,  and  the  progressive  increa-
se  in  farmland  prices on  the other,  have  a  decidedly  adverse effect  on  Land 
mobility.  In  the  interest of  stimulating  a  Level  of  Land  mobility  necessary 
to facilitate the  structural  reform  of  agriculture, an  equitable  solution 
to this problem  is both  desirable and  necessary. Table  5 - Evolution  of  Farmland  Prices  in  the E.E.c.,  1963  to  1975  by  Member  State 
MEMBER  STATE  Land  prices per  hectare  (c)  Annual  percentage  change 
1963  1970  1973  1974  1975  1965/70  1970/73  1973/74  1974/75 
Germany  1. 279  1. 884  2.169  2.020  2.059  + 5,7  + 4,8  :  + 1,9 
France 
- t i llage  land  351  642  854  986  1.121  + 9,0  + 9,9  +15,5  +13,7 
-.  po  .... t.ure  399  606  766  862  978  + 6,2  + 8,1  +12,5  +13,5 
Italy 
- pasture  370  513  689  881  1. 027  + 4,8  +10,3  +28,0  +16,5 
Netherlands 
- till  age  land  769  1. 061  1.149  1.416  1.637  + 4,7  +  2,7  + 8,9  +15,6 
- pasture  644  916  1.054  1.374  1. 642  + 5,2  + o, 1  +14,8  +19,5 
Belgium 
- till  age  land  1. 706  2.467  2.362  2.570  2.726  + 5,4  - 1,5  + 8,8  + 6,0  " 
- pasture  1. 022  1.910  1.995  2.146  2.370  + 9,3  + 1,4  + 7,6  +10,4 
Luxembourg 
- t i llage  land  775  ~ 
:  1.152  1.994  (+73, 1)  - pasture  859 
:  :  :  : 
United  Kingdom 
- England  and  Wales  289  526  1.161  1.574  1.290  + 8,9  +31,0  +35,5  -18,0 
- Scotland  :  244  663  780  :  :  +38,0  +17,7  : 
- Northern  Ireland  :  434  835  971  :  :  +24,4  +16,3  : 
Ire  land  :  491  1.  261  :  :  :  +36,9  :  : 
Denmark  379  717  1.058  1.379  1.651  + 9,5  +13,8  +30,3  +19,8 
----~---------------- -- ·- ------ ---
Source  :  SOEC  on  the  basis of  national data;  estimation  by  D.G.  VI. Table 6: Evolution of  Lease  Rents  in  some  Member  States  of  the E.E.C., 1963  to  1974  by  Member  State 
Member  State  Lease  rents per  hectare  (t)  Annual  percentage  change  Lease  rent  as % of  Land  price 
1963  1970  1973  1974  1975  '63/70  '70/73  '73/74  '74/75  1963  1970  1973  1974  1975 
Germany  :  :  27,0  28,1  29,1  :  :  +  4,1  + 3,5  :  :  1,3  1,4  1,4 
France 
- tiLLage  Land  12,0  14,3  17,6  18,7  20,9  +  2,5  +  7,2  +  6,0  +11,6  3,4  2,2  2,1  1 ,9  1,9 
Italy 
- tiLLage  Land  :  31,5  33,0  :  :  :  + 1,6  :  :  :  6,1  4;8  :  : 
Netherlands 
- tiLLage  Land  15,1  24,4  27,4  29,3  32,2  +  7,1  +  3,7  + 8,0  + 9,7  2,0  2,3  2,4  2,1  2,0 
- pasture  15,3  20,4  25,1  25,7  28,5  + 4,2  +  7,1  +10,2  +11 ,o  2,4  2,2  2,4  1,9  1,7 
00 
Belgium 
- tiLlage  Land  24,2  29,1  30,5  31,2  32,3  + 2,7  +  1,6  +  2,3  + 3,4  1,4  1 ,2  1,1  1 ,2  1 ,2 
- pasture  25,4  30,0  31,1  31,9  32,7  +  2,4  +  1,3  +  2,6  +  2,5  2,5  1,6  1,5  1,5  1,4 
Eng Land  &  WaLes  :  13,6  17,3  19,5  23,7  :  + 8,5  +12,5  +21 ,4  :  2,6  1 ,5  1 ,2  1,8 
L_ __ 
Source  SOEC  on  the  basis of  national data. 
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Fiscal  Policy 
In  the  context  of  fiscal  policy the effects of  four  main  types  of  capital 
taxation on  farm  development  may  be  examined:  capital  gains tax, wealth 
tax, gift  (capital  transfer)  tax,  and  inheritance  tax. 
Capital  gain  taxes  are  levied  on  gain~ made  on  the  increase  in  the  value 
of  property  which  are  usually  realised  when  the porperty  is  sold.  In  prac-
tice  capital  gains  taxes  are  linked with  income  taxation.  All  Member  States 
of  the  EEC  employ  this  system  of  taxation. 
Wealth  taxes  are  recurrent  taxes  which  are  usually  levied on  the  taxpayer's 
total  assets  less  liabilities, irrespective of  whether  or not  the assets 
yield a  money  income.  Currently such  a  form  of  taxation exists  in  Germany, 
the  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Ireland  and  Denmark. 
Gift  taxes  are normally  imposed  on  gifts made  at  any  time  during  a  per-
son's  life time.  This  type  of  taxation exists  in  seven  of  the  nine Member 
States of  Community,  the  exceptions  being  Belgium  and  Luxembourg. 
Inheritance  taxes  usually exist  in  one  of  two  forms  a)  estate duties 
which  are  imposed  at  progressive  rate  on  the estate of  a  deceased  person 
and  b)  acquisition taxes  which  are  imposed  on  the  benefits acquired  by 
beneficiaries of  the estate of  a  deceased  person.  The  rate  of  tax  is 
usually determined  for  each  beneficiary according  to  his  relations~ip 
with  the  deceased  person. 
Acquisition  taxation operates  in  all Member  States except  the  United 
Kingdom  where  tax  is  borne  by  the  donor,  for gifts, or  the deceased's 
estate for  inheri t'ance. 
Impact  of  fiscal policy on  agriculture. 
Although  farmers  are  usually  subject  to  the  normal  tax  regulations  in  all 
Member  States, special  provisions  generally apply  to agriculture  in  the 
legislation  on  capital  taxation  in  all Member  States except  Denmark.  These 
provisions  result  in  a  considerable  reduction  in  the  tax  burden  or  indeed 
in  the total exemption  of  a  sizeable proportion of  farmers  from  paying 
capital taxes.  In  effect  apart  from  the  Netherlands,  where  realized capi-
tal gains  are treated as  income,  and  in  Denmark,  it  is mainly  the  very 
large-scale  farmers  who  are normally  caught  in  the  tax  net. 
However,  in  the majority of Member  States, the market  value  of  farmland  is 
used  as  the  basis of  assessment  for  taxation.  Thus  where  the  rates  of 
duty payable progress  to  relatively high  levels, a  continuing  inflation 
in  land  values  will  increasingly  bring more  farmers  into the  tax  bracket 
even  under  existing  taxation  rates.  In  such  situations  significant problems 
associated with  the  financing  of  real  estate  will  be  aggravated  further 
particularly if  the  current  trend  which  emphasises  an  increase  in  occupier-
ownership  and  a  corresponding  decrease  in  farm  tenancy  continues  indefini-
tely. - 10  -
Relevant  issues for  agricultural  development 
1.  Tenure  structures are  influenced  to  a  significant extent  by  prevailing 
Laws  and  traditions  in  particular  countries;  as  such  they  often  fail  to 
keep  abreast  of  dynamic  changes  in  agriculture  resulting  from  technolo-
gical  innovations.  Thus,  occupier-ownership of  Land,  which  is  the  domi-
nant  tenure  system  in  all Member  States of  the  E.E.C.,  except  Belgium, 
is  strenqthened  in  many  countries  through  the  operation  of  numerous  Land 
Laws  and  ordinances;  yet  in  modern  times  it  can  result  in  serious malad-
justments  in  agriculture.  Because  of  the  substantial  immobilisation  of 
capital  which  it entails, many  of  the  advantages  which  hitherto favou-
red this tenure  system  might  be  expected  to  diminish  rapidly, particu-
Larly  in  the  current era of  inflated  Land  prices.  Furthermore,  the  sys-
tem  would  appear  to  be  far  too  rigid  to  permit  the  degree  of  Land  mobi-
lity necessary  to ensure  the  rapid  adjustment  of  agriculture to the 
needs  of  modern  economic  development. 
2.  The  statutory  control  of  Lease  rents  in  those Member  States where 
tenancy  is  important - Luxembourg  being  the  sole  exception - has  been 
introduced mainly  for  social  reasons.  But  now  such  control  has  led  to  a 
return  on  land  investment  ranging  from  1 to 3  per  cent  approximately. 
This  means  in  effect that  unless  he  has  other  sources of  income, 
the  absolute  return  on  the  land  owner's  investment  may  not  be  sufficient 
to provide  him  with  what  he  regards  as  an  adequate  income.  Consequently 
many  Land  owners  now  tend  to  exercice their  right  to  resume  the  occupa-
tion of  their  land  at  the  end  of  the  tenancy  period  in  order to  farm 
it themselves  or to sell it. This  is one  of  the main  factors  which 
tend  to  discourage  the  operation  of  the  tenancy  system  in  some  Member 
States.  Thus  in  the  interests of  stimulating  the  level of  land  mobility 
necessary to facilitate  the  structural  reform  of  agriculture  and  equi-
table solution to this problem  is  both  desirable and  necessary.  The 
aim  should  be  to  promote  a  tenure  structure with  sufficient flexibility 
to permit  the  size of  farms  and  the  adoption  of  new  technology to  keep 
pace  with  dynamic  changes  within  agriculture.  Such  a  tenure  structure 
should,  in  the  interests of  small-scale  farmers  and  new  entrants to the 
industry, of  necessity  emphasise  equitable  tenancy  arrangements  rather 
than  absolute  occupier-ownership  of  Land  as  the  basic  system  of  land 
tenure  in Member  States where  the  foregoing  problem  prevails. 
3.  Clearly,  farmland  prices are  now  reaching  a  level  where  they  tend  to 
have  an  adverse  impact  on  land  mobility, particularly  in  some  Member 
States where  occupier-ownership  of  Land  is  the  dominant  tenure  system. 
This  situation considerably  restricts the  opportunities for  structural 
reform  in  many  regions  of  the  Community.  Furthermore,  increasing 
interest  rates  for  long  term  Loans  are  now  at  such  a  level  in  some 
Member  States that  they  have  become  a  significant barrier  to  land 
acquisition for  many  farmers  who  must,  of  necessity, borrow  a  sizeable 
part  of  the  capital necessary  for  such  purposes.  In  addition,  in  si-
tuations  where  the market  value  of  land  is used  as  a  basis  for  tax 
assessment,  progressively more  farmers  will  come  into the tax  bracket 
if the  inflation in  land  prices  continues  on  its present  scale. 
Thus,  the tenure  situation and  the agricultural Land  market  in  a  humber  f 
Member  States present  some  formidable  problems  which  are  in  urgent  nee 
of  solution  if the  development  of  agriculture  is to proceed  along  the 
most  desirable  lines possible  in  any  given  set  of  circumstances. 